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Abstract The forensic two-trace problem is a perplexing inference problem
introduced by Evett (J Forensic Sci Soc 27:375–381, 1987). Different possible ways
of wording the competing pair of propositions (i.e., one proposition advanced by the
prosecution and one proposition advanced by the defence) led to different quanti-
fications of the value of the evidence (Meester and Sjerps in Biometrics 59:727–
732, 2003). Here, we re-examine this scenario with the aim of clarifying the
interrelationships that exist between the different solutions, and in this way, produce
a global vision of the problem. We propose to investigate the different expressions
for evaluating the value of the evidence by using a graphical approach, i.e. Bayesian
networks, to model the rationale behind each of the proposed solutions and the
assumptions made on the unknown parameters in this problem.
Keywords Evaluation of evidence  Value of the evidence  Graphical probability
models  Bayesian networks  Two-trace problem
1 Introduction
The two-trace problem, introduced by Evett (1987), is a perplexing inference
problem that continues to puzzle many forensic scientists. It considers a scenario
where forensic investigators recover two items of a particular category of trace
evidence on a crime scene, e.g. two bloodstains, and compare both of these to the
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sample taken from a suspect. The question of interest to the court is, ‘How strong is
the evidence resulting from these two comparisons in favor of the prosecution or the
defence?’
The objective of the forensic scientist’s testimony is to answer this question. The
answer to this question takes the form of the value of the evidence (e.g., Aitken and
Taroni 2004):
V ¼ Prðevidencejproposition 1; IÞ
Prðevidencejproposition 2; IÞ ; ð1Þ
where proposition 1 is the proposition advanced by the prosecution, proposition 2
the proposition advanced by the defence, and I the background information con-
sisting of the forensic scientist’s knowledge on the case circumstances prior to
observing the evidence. The evidence is an intrinsic trait (e.g., the blood group or
DNA profile) of the two traces and the suspect’s sample, observed as a result of the
test or analysis performed in the forensic laboratory. Prior to hearing the forensic
scientist’s testimony, the prosecution and the defence each take position on the
origin of the traces. These views are formalized into the two propositions, that is,
into two statements that are each either true or false. As a pair, these propositions
must be mutually exclusive,1 yet there is no requirement for them to be exhaustive2
(e.g., Robertson and Vignaux 1995; Aitken and Taroni 2004). In this case, the first
proposition (advanced by the prosecution) links the suspect to the crime stains, and
the second (advanced by the defence) rejects such a link. The fact-finder (a judge or
jury member) has a particular degree of belief in the truth of each of these prop-
ositions before hearing the forensic testimony. By presenting the value of the evi-
dence V, the forensic scientist’s testimony conveys by how much more or less the
evidence supports the first proposition with regard to the second proposition: if
V [ 1, the evidence supports the first proposition; if V \ 1, the evidence supports
the second proposition; and if V = 1, the evidence does not provide support for
either of the two propositions, meaning that it is irrelevant for discriminating
between them. Hence, the value of the evidence allows the fact-finder to update his
or her belief in the truth of these propositions, and construct an informed opinion
about each party’s account of the events.
1.1 Aim and outline of this paper
With two traces making up the recovered evidence, there are several possibilities for
formulating a pair of propositions: they can focus on one of the two traces, or on
both, and in the latter case, either specify or not specify which of the two traces
originates (or does not originate) from the suspect. What is disturbing for a fact-
finder hearing a forensic scientist’s testimony in the context of a two-trace problem,
is that the value of the evidence, as given by Eq. (1), is different for different pairs of
propositions (Meester and Sjerps 2003).
1 Two propositions are mutually exclusive if they cannot both be true at the same time.
2 A set of propositions is exhaustive if it covers all scenarios, so that at least one of its propositions is
always true.
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The aim of this paper is to investigate the value of the evidence in a two-trace
problem with regard to different pairs of propositions, by unifying three different
pairs in a single framework. To accomplish this, we will construct a Bayesian
network, i.e., a graphical probability model. In forensic contexts, Bayesian networks
help examine the reasonableness of the formal derivation of a formula, that is, the
assumptions that have been made (Taroni et al. 2006). This allows us to compare
the derived values of the evidence for different pairs of propositions. In addition,
these models allow the user to perform complex probabilistic calculations that take
into account the probability assignments over all of the unknown parameters. In this
way, we hope to provide a global model which offers a complete and realistic
approach to the valuation of scientific evidence in a two-trace problem. With this
model, we hope to draw the reader’s attention to the importance of the formulation
of a pair of propositions, and increase his/her awareness of the impact that subtle
differences in these formulations can have on the value of the evidence.
Besides a brief description of what Bayesian networks are and how they work
(Sect. 2), we do not give a detailed explanation on Bayesian networks, and refer the
interested reader to one of the many publications on the subject (e.g., Jensen 2001;
Kjaerulff and Madsen 2008). Section 3 gives an overview of the two-trace problem
as we will treat it in this paper, and Sect. 4 describes the notation we will use.
Section 5 explains how we construct the Bayesian network, and Sects. 6 and 7
illustrate the use of this model and the influence of the different parameters through
a numerical example. Concluding remarks are in Sect. 8.
2 Bayesian networks
Bayesian networks are graphical probability models, also known as probabilistic
expert systems. The key advantage of these models is their capacity of splitting up a
complex inference problem into its different parts. They represent random variables
as nodes, and dependence relationships between the random variables as arrows
connecting the nodes to form a directed acyclic graph. The random variables can be
either discrete or continuous, but for the sake of simplicity we will use discrete
nodes in this paper. Thus, each random variable will consist of a finite and
exhaustive list of mutually exclusive states. The arrows model the probabilistic
relationships between the variables by connecting a ‘parent’ node to a ‘child’ node.
They condition the probability distribution of the child node upon each of its parents
with probability tables that allow the user to quantify the probabilistic relationships.
In this way, the Bayesian network decomposes the joint probability distribution
of a set of random variables X1, …, Xn into the product of each of their probabilities
conditioned on their parents. This is known as the Markov property:
PrðX1; . . .; XnÞ ¼
Yn
i¼1
PrðXijparentsðXiÞÞ: ð2Þ
It is important to stress that there is no true model, because a model is personal
and reflects the constructor’s view of the problem and the information available at
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the time of the construction (Lindley 2000). As our understanding of the issue
progresses, the constructed network may evolve to model a situation more
accurately, so that several different Bayesian network structures may be accepted as
a description of the same scenario (Garbolino 2001).
The relevance of Bayesian networks for applications in forensic science was first
recognized—in print—by Aitken and Gammerman (1989). Key publications in
legal literature followed (Edwards 1991; Schum 1994; Kadane and Schum 1996),
presenting thorough descriptions of the potential of probabilistic models for
reasoning about evidence in real cases. Since then, the application of Bayesian
networks has covered different aspects of evidential assessment (Taroni et al. 2006),
in particular the evaluation of DNA evidence (Dawid et al. 2002, 2007; Mortera
et al. 2003), evidence collected in fire debris (Biedermann et al. 2005a, b), firearm
evidence (Biedermann and Taroni 2006; Biedermann et al. 2009), and fibre
evidence (Garbolino and Taroni 2002), as well as practical considerations on how to
present their results in court (Fenton and Neil 2011).
In this study, we constructed the Bayesian networks using the software Hugin
Researcher 7.3, by Hugin Expert A/S. This program allows the user to construct and
use Bayesian networks that contain numerical probability values. It can only carry
out numerical propagations between the nodes. To derive the algebraic expressions
corresponding to the calculations performed by the model, the user applies Eq. (2).
The probabilistic relationships defined by the structure and the probability tables tell
the user how the probability of a compound event is broken down into separate
conditional probabilities.
3 The two-trace problem
We denote the following pair of propositions ‘pair H’:
Proposition 1: At least one of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
Proposition 2: Neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect.
These propositions are called source level propositions according to the hierarchy
of propositions defined by Cook et al. (1998), because they describe whether a
particular object or person is the source, or origin, of the traces recovered on the
crime scene. Source level propositions are different from activity level propositions
(describing the activity that led to the transfer of the traces from their source to the
crime scene) and crime level propositions (concerned with whether the suspect
actually committed the crime under investigation). In this paper we treat only source
level propositions. For activity or crime level evaluations of the evidence in a two-
trace problem, see Triggs and Buckleton (2003) and Gittelson et al. (2012), and
Dawid (2004), respectively.
The value of the evidence with regard to the above propositions depends on the
evidence observed. There are three possibilities:
1. If neither of the two crime stains matches the suspect’s sample, then the
likelihood of the first proposition is 0, and consequently Eq. (1) becomes
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V ¼ 0; ð3Þ
2. If one of the crime stains matches the suspect’s sample, Evett (1987) showed
that this leads to
V ¼ 1
2c
; ð4Þ
where c represents the match probability (Weir 2000) of the matching trait in the
relevant population of possible crime stain donors [Note that originally, Evett
(1987) did not deduce this expression for the source level propositions as described,
but for their equivalents at the crime level, assuming the relevance of both traces to
be maximal. A crime level evaluation with maximal relevance produces the same
value of the evidence as the source level evaluation presented here (see, e.g., Aitken
and Taroni 2004)];
3. And if both of the crime stains match the suspect’s sample, most forensic
scientists would assume that the two traces come from a single contributor so
that Eq. (1) reduces to
V ¼ 1
c
: ð5Þ
These assessments are based on the assumption that no laboratory errors are pos-
sible, an assumption we maintain throughout this paper. Note, however, that
relaxing this assumption may have a considerable effect on the value of the evi-
dence (Thompson et al. 2003).
Among these three ratios, Eqs. (3) and (5) are the same as for a scenario
involving a single crime stain. This is because the differentiation between the two
traces is not necessary in these cases in order to describe the observed evidence. In
these two cases, one can combine the two crime stains into a single group, which we
see as either matching (Eq. 5), or not matching (Eq. 3) the suspect’s sample. In both
of these cases, the reasoning that leads to Eqs. (3) and (5) is the same as that applied
to the evaluation of the value of a single crime stain.
This is different for the case involving one matching stain and one non-matching
stain (item 2 in the list). This case requires the forensic scientist to distinguish
between the two traces by multiplying the traditional value of 1c by a factor of 0.5
(we will discuss the meaning of this additional factor in Sect. 7). This is the case
which interests us in this paper.
Evett (1987) was not the only author to treat this problem. After Evett (1987), the
case of one matching stain and one non-matching stain gave rise to the formulation
of other propositions, which led to evidential values that were not equal to Eq. (4).
According to Meester and Sjerps (2003), a pair of propositions worded slightly
differently (note that the wording of these propositions has been modified here with
regard to their original formulation in Meester and Sjerps (2003), yet their logical
meaning remains unchanged), that is,
Proposition 1: Crime stain 1 comes from the suspect;
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Proposition 2: Neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
(we denote this pair ‘pair H01’) produced a value of
1
c
; ð6Þ
and the pair
Proposition 1: Crime stain 1 comes from the suspect;
Proposition 2: Crime stain 1 does not come from the suspect;
(denoted ‘pair H001 ’) produced a value of
3
2  d
2cð1  dÞ ; ð7Þ
for evidence consisting of a match between crime stain 1 and the suspect’s sample,
and a non-match between crime stain 2 and the suspect’s sample. In Eq. (7), the
probability denoted d represents the prior probability that the suspect was one of two
crime stain donors. This probability had to be introduced to correctly evaluate the
probability of the evidence given proposition 2 and I. See Sect. 7.3 for further
explanations.
The pair of propositions H (on page 4) is related to the above two pairs (pairs
H01 and H
00
1 ) when the forensic scientist observes a match between the suspect’s
sample and stain 1, and a non-match between the suspect’s sample and stain 2: in
this case, all three pairs of propositions have identical posterior odds of
d
2ð1  dÞc ; ð8Þ
for a prior probability of d that the suspect was a crime stain donor (Note that we
call the odds of a pair of propositions ‘prior odds’ before observing the evidence,
and ‘posterior odds’ after observing the evidence. We use the terms ‘prior proba-
bility’ and ‘posterior probability’ in the same way).
Here, the observation of a matching trait in the suspect’s sample and stain 1, and
a non-matching trait in the suspect’s sample and stain 2 has made the three pairs of
propositions logically equivalent, since it has become impossible for the suspect to
be the donor of stain 2. Algebraically, this comes down to multiplying the value of
the evidence by the corresponding pair of propositions’ prior odds according to the
odds’ form of Bayes’ theorem (Meester and Sjerps 2003):
d
1  d|ﬄ{zﬄ}
prior odds for pair H
 1
2c|{z}
value of the evidence for pair H
; ð9Þ
3 Note that Eq. (7) gives the simplified form of the value of the evidence, so that the numerator and
denominator of this ratio do not represent the probabilities forming the numerator and denominator in
Eq. (1).
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d=2
1  d|ﬄ{zﬄ}
prior odds for pair H0
1
 1
c|{z}
value of the evidence for pair H0
1
; ð10Þ
d=2
1  d=2|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
prior odds for pair H00
1
 2  d
2cð1  dÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
value of the evidence for pair H00
1
: ð11Þ
Meester and Sjerps (2003) and Meester and Sjerps (2004a, b) conclude from this
that forensic scientists should use posterior odds in the place of the value of the
evidence to communicate the strength of forensic evidence, a recommendation
which makes no attempt at clarifying the logical relationships between the three
pairs of propositions and their different values for the same evidence [a point
criticized by Dawid (2004)].
The Bayesian network we present in Sect. 5 will illustrate the interrelationships
between these three pairs of propositions by modeling them in separate nodes.
Before explaining the rationale behind this model, the next section presents the
notation we will use in the rest of this paper.
4 Notation
We distinguish between the background information (Sect. 4.1), the propositions
(Sect. 4.2), the unknown parameters d, k and s (Sect. 4.3), and the evidence
(Sect. 4.4).
4.1 Background information
The background information I is all of the knowledge available prior to observing the
evidence. This information includes the case circumstances (e.g., the location of the
crime scene), the facts surrounding the recovery of the two traces on the crime scene
(e.g., their exact locations on the scene), the fact that one suspect has been found from
whom a sample has been obtained for comparison with the recovered traces, and the non-
scientific information associating this suspect to the crime scene (e.g., witness
statements asserting the suspect’s presence near the scene). All of the probabilities
assessed in a case are conditional probabilities given I. However, for the sake of brevity
in the mathematical expressions that follow, we shall hereafter omit I from their notation.
4.2 Propositions
The propositions reflect the viewpoints of the prosecution and the defence. At the
time they are formulated, the evidence has not yet been observed, so that these
formulations are independent of the evidence, and based solely on the background
information. Each proposition depicts the most plausible situation(s) given the
party’s point of view and the background information (Robertson and Vignaux
1995). Since the background information is case-specific, one pair of propositions
may be reasonable in one case, yet unreasonable in another case.
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Section 1 introduced four propositions, which we denote with capital letters as
follows:
D—at least one of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
D—neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
C1—crime stain 1 comes from the suspect;
C1—crime stain 1 does not come from the suspect.
The horizontal bar over a capital letter means that the proposition described is the
negation of the proposition denoted by that letter (i.e., its complement). The number
figuring as a subscript to propositions C and C indicates which crime stain the
proposition refers to. Analogous to C1 and C1; we also formulate:
C2—crime stain 2 comes from the suspect;
C2—crime stain 2 does not come from the suspect.
Meester and Sjerps (2003) considered 3 pairs of propositions, denoted here as pairs
H, H01; andH
00
1 (the subscript ‘1’ indicates that the pair contains at least one
proposition referring only to crime stain 1). These combine in different ways the
four propositions D, D; C1 and C1 as follows:
pair H: D—at least one of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
D—neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
pair H01: C1—crime stain 1 comes from the suspect;
D—neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
pair H001 : C1—crime stain 1 comes from the suspect;
C1—crime stain 1 does not come from the suspect.
To model a pair of propositions as a node in a Bayesian network, the node must
have an exhaustive list of states (see Sect. 2). The propositions in pairs H and H001
already form an exhaustive set of possibilities, and can therefore be modeled as
nodes with two states. Yet pair H01 is not exhaustive because it does not consider the
possibility that crime stain 2 comes from the suspect. An exhaustive list would need
to include all of the possible combinations between C1; C1; C2 and C2; i.e.,
C1 \ C2—both crime stains come from the suspect;
C1 \ C2—crime stain 1 comes from the suspect,
and crime stain 2 does not come from the suspect;
C1 \ C2—crime stain 1 does not come from the suspect,
but crime stain 2 comes from the suspect;
C1 \ C2—neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect.
In this list, proposition D is equivalent to C1 \ C2; and proposition C1 to fC1 \
C2g [ fC1 \ C2g: Modeling pair H01 as a node with exhaustive states in a Bayesian
network will therefore require the additional state C1 \ C2 in this node.
Analogous to pair H01, we define pair H
0
2 for the combination of C2 and
D:
pair H02: C2—crime stain 2 comes from the suspect;
D—neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect;
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and analogous to pair H001 , we define pair H
00
2 for the combination of C2 and
C2 :
pair H002 : C2—crime stain 2 comes from the suspect;
C2—crime stain 2 does not come from the suspect.
Modeling pair H02 as a node in a Bayesian network will follow the same reasoning as
for pair H01 by requiring the additional state C1 \ C2 to make the node’s states
exhaustive.
4.3 Unknown parameters
The two-trace problem involves three unknown parameters (Table 1):
– d: The first parameter, d, we encountered in Eq. (7). This is the prior probability
that the suspect is a crime stain donor, i.e.,
PrðDÞ ¼ d;
as defined in Meester and Sjerps (2003). d describes the probability that a trace
recovered on the crime scene comes from the suspect based on the information
available prior to the laboratory analyses of the crime stains. This parameter takes
into account the background information regarding the suspect’s presence on or
near the crime scene during the lapse of time when the traces were deposited (for
example, witness statements, data from mobile phone providers, and images from
surveillance cameras), as well as background information regarding the suspect’s
ability to transfer the type of trace evidence in question (for example in the case of
recovered bloodstains, the fact that the suspect had a scratch, cut or other injury
with blood loss at the time when the traces were deposited would increase d). In
this model, the value of d is based on this background information alone, inde-
pendent of whether the recovered traces come from a single source or from two
different sources. Note however that in some cases this assumption of d being
independent of the total number of crime stain donors may not be reasonable.
Notably when the background information described above is very poor or not
available, it may be reasonable to assume that d is greater in the case of two donors
than in the case of a single donor (Meester and Sjerps 2004a, b). This situation is
not treated in this paper, but it would require an additional dependence rela-
tionship in the Bayesian network presented in Sect. 5 (Fig. 2).
– k: The second parameter describes the uncertainty on the number of donors
(Dawid 2004). Defined by Dawid (2004), k represents the probability that there
are two distinct donors. Before observing the evidence, all we know is that there
are two traces. A priori, these may come from the same source with a probability
of 1 - k, and from two different sources with a probability of k.
– s: The third parameter, s, considers the conditional probability that crime stain 1
comes from the suspect given that the suspect is one of two crime stain donors, i.e.,
PrðC1j2 donors; DÞ ¼ s:
From this definition, it follows that 1 - s is the probability of crime stain 2 coming
from the suspect given that the suspect is the source of one of the two traces, i.e.,
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PrðC2j2 donors; DÞ ¼ 1  s:
All of these parameters are assessed on the basis of the background information
alone, that is, before observing the evidence: the value of d will depend on the prior
information regarding the suspect’s connection to the crime scene; and the values of k
and s are based on the circumstancial information of the case, including the location of
each of the traces on the scene, witness reports, and images from surveillance cameras.
These prior assessments determine the prior probabilities of the propositions (see
column 3 of Table 2). The probabilities of D and D are determined by d, as
described above. The probabilities of C1, C1;C2 and C2 are made up of the
probabilities of C1 \ C2, C1 \ C2; C1 \ C2 and C1 \ C2, which are
PrðC1 \ C2Þ ¼ dð1  kÞ
PrðC1 \ C2Þ ¼ dks
Prð C1 \ C2Þ ¼ dkð1  sÞ
Prð C1 \ C2Þ ¼ 1  d;
so that the probabilities of C1; C1; C2 and C2 are
PrðC1Þ ¼ PrðC1 \ C2Þ þ PrðC1 \ C2Þ
¼ dð1  kÞ þ dks;
Prð C1Þ ¼ Prð C1 \ C2Þ þ Prð C1 \ C2Þ
¼ dkð1  sÞ þ 1  d;
PrðC2Þ ¼ PrðC1 \ C2Þ þ Prð C1 \ C2Þ
¼ dð1  kÞ þ dkð1  sÞ;
and
Prð C2Þ ¼ PrðC1 \ C2Þ þ Prð C1 \ C2Þ
¼ dksþ 1  d:
The examples in Sects. 6 and 7 will illustrate the impact of parameters d, k and s
on the value of the evidence and on the posterior odds of the different pairs of
propositions.
4.4 Evidence
The evidence is the new piece of information we observe. It is the compound event
of observing the states of the three variables X, Y1 and Y2. X denotes the profile of
Table 1 Definition of the
parameters d, k and s d Probability that the suspect is a crime stain donor
k Probability that there were two distinct donors
s Probability that crime stain 1 comes from the suspect, given that
the suspect is one of two donors
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the suspect’s sample, Y1 the profile of the first of the recovered traces, which we call
‘crime stain 1’, and Y2 the profile of the second of the recovered traces, which we
call ‘crime stain 2’.
We assume that the analysis performed is capable of distinguishing between k
different profiles, which we label C1;C2; . . .;Ck: Profile Ci; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; k; has a
match probability of ci in the relevant population of possible crime stain donors.
Note that the relevant population is defined on the basis of the background
information. Before observing the evidence, X, Y1, and Y2 each have a probability of
ci, i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; k;
P
ci = 1, to have profile Ci: After observing the evidence, the
states of X, Y1, and Y2 are known with certainty. They are each equal to one of the k
profiles, C1;C2; . . .;Ck:
In the next section, we combine the above evidence, propositions, and parameters
in a Bayesian network for the two-trace problem.
Y2
X
H
Y1 Y2
Y1
F
Fig. 1 The Bayesian network
presented in Taroni et al. (2006)
for a very specific scenario of
the two-trace problem. Nodes
H, X, Y1 and Y2 consist of the
states presented in Table 2, and
node F of the states C1 \ C2;
C1 \ C2 and C1 \ C2  D
H’’2
Y1 Y2
X
LH
1H’ H’2
Y1Y2
δ
τ
λ
1H’’
Fig. 2 The extended Bayesian network for the two-trace problem. This model is more flexible and
realistic than the Bayesian network shown in Fig. 1, because it models the uncertainty on the number of
crime stain donors, and the uncertainty on which trace comes from the suspect if the suspect is one of two
donors. It also includes a node for each of the unknown parameters, allowing the user to define a
probability distribution for each. Table 1 gives the definitions of the parameters, and Table 2 lists the
definitions and probabilities of the states in each of the non-parametric nodes
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5 Constructing a Bayesian network
The aim of this section is to construct a Bayesian network containing the
propositions, the parameters, and the evidence, defined in the previous section. This
section contains several technical details of the constructed Bayesian network, and
Table 2 Description of the states of the non-parametric nodes in the Bayesian network in Fig. 2
Nodes States Probabilities Definitions of the states
H D d At least one of the crime stains comes from the suspect
D 1 - d Neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect
L 1 donor 1 - k The crime stains come from the same source
2 donors k The crime stains come from two different sources
H001 C1 d(1 - k ? ks) Crime stain 1 comes from the suspect
C1 dk(1 - s) ? 1 - d Crime stain 1 does not come from the suspect
H002 C2 d[1 - k ? k(1 - s)] Crime stain 2 comes from the suspect
C2 dks ? 1 - d Crime stain 2 does not come from the suspect
H01 C1 d(1 - k ? ks) Crime stain 1 comes from the suspect
C1 \ C2 dk(1 - s) Only crime stain 2 comes from the suspect
D 1 - d Neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect
H02 C2 d[1 - k ? k(1 - s)] Crime stain 2 comes from the suspect
C1 \ C2 dks Only crime stain 1 comes from the suspect
D 1 - d Neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect
X C1 c1 Profile of the suspect’s sample
C2 c2
..
. ..
.
Ck ck
Y1 C1 c1 Profile of crime stain 1
C2 c2
..
. ..
.
Ck ck
Y2 C1 c1 Profile of crime stain 2
C2 c2
..
. ..
.
Ck ck
Y1Y2 C1C1 c1 c1 Profiles of crime stains 1 and 2 (as ordered pairs)
C1C2 c1c2
C2C1 c2 c1
..
. ..
.
CkCk ck ck
The parameters d, k, and s are defined in Table 1
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may be skipped by readers interested more in the application of the model than in its
construction. For the propositions we create nodes H, H01; H
00
1 ; H
0
2 and H
00
2 , and for
the evidence, nodes X, Y1 and Y2. Table 2 provides the exhaustive list of the states
and probabilities associated to each of these nodes.
Taroni et al. (2006) proposed a model containing some of these nodes for a very
specific scenario of a two-trace problem (Fig. 1). In this model, node F contains the
inexhaustive list of states C1 \ C2; C1 \ C2 and C1 \ C2: This model sets the profile
of Y1 equal to the profile of X if C1 is true, and the profile of Y2 equal to the profile of
X if C2 is true. Concerning the propositions, it specifies that C1 and C2 can only be
true if D (in node H) is true. However, this model makes the assumption that C1 and
C2 are equally likely under D, and it does not consider the possibility of C1 and C2
being true at the same time (i.e., node F contains an inexhaustive list of states).
Node Y1Y2 combines the states of Y1 and Y2 as ordered pairs, so that the model
computes the compound probability of the two crime stain profiles. This node is
necessary for evaluating the value of the evidence (see Sect. 7).
We use this model as a starting point to extend and improve it to a more general
Bayesian network for evaluating the value of the evidence in a two-trace problem.
For this, we examine the following points: the relationship between the proposi-
tional nodes (Sect. 5.1), the uncertainty on the number of donors (Sect. 5.2), and the
relationship between the propositional and the evidential nodes (Sect. 5.3).
5.1 Relationships between the propositional nodes H; H01; H
00
1 ; H
0
2 and H
00
2
The postdata equivalence presented in Sect. 3 indicates a relationship between the
nodes containing the pairs of propositions H, H01 and H
00
1 . To expose the links that
exist between these nodes, we analyze the logical relationships between the
propositions that form the nodes’ states.
The difference between proposition D and propositions C1 and C2 is that the
former does not specify which trace, or traces, come(s) from the suspect, whereas
the latter do. Logically, this means that propositions C1 and C2 are two subsets of
proposition D, i.e., C1  D and C2  D: In a Bayesian network, this relationship
may be modeled by conditioning the probabilities of C1 and C2 on D (Taroni et al.
2006). In other words, we model node H (containing proposition D) as a parent of
nodes H001 (containing proposition C1) and H
00
2 (containing proposition C2).
As for nodes H01 and H
0
2, their states
C1 \ C2; C1 \ C2 and D¯ (: C1 \ C2) are
combinations of C1, C1, C2, and C2. Each of these combinations is a subset of its
single components: {C1 \ C2}, C1, {C1 \ C2}, C2, { C1 \ C2}, C1, { C1 \ C2}
, C2, D, C1 and D¯, C2. Again, we find it convenient to model a subset as a child
of its superset. Therefore, we model nodes H01 and H
0
2 as children of nodes
H001 and H
00
2 , with the conditional probability distributions given in Tables 3 and 4.
The resulting hierarchical ordering, from the parent node to the child node, is
therefore:
H ! fH001 ; H002g ! fH01; H02g:
Our Bayesian network will reflect this hierarchy.
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5.2 Uncertainty on the number of donors
To take into account the possibility that there was only one donor, we add an
additional node L made up of the states ‘1 donor’ and ‘2 donors’. We use the
parameter k, denoting the prior probability of ‘2 donors’, to introduce the
uncertainty on the number of donors into this node.
The states of node L add a constraint on the probability distribution over
C1; C1; C2; and C2; and on the observed profile of crime stain 2 (Y2) given the profile
of crime stain 1 (Y1). That is, if there is only 1 donor, then Y2 must be equal to Y1,
and both C1 and C2 must be true or false, together, according to whether D is true or
false. If there are 2 donors, then either C1 or C2 will be true when D is true, but
never both C1 and C2. In the case of two donors, the parameter s (denoting Pr(C1|2
donors, D)) determines the probability distribution over C1 and C2 under proposition
D. Tables 5 and 6 describe the logical relationships between the propositions
C1; C1; C2; and C2 and the propositions D and D given the number of donors
specified in node L.
5.3 Relationship between the propositional and evidential nodes
As proposed by Taroni et al. (2006), the profile of each crime stain depends on
whether that particular crime stain comes from the suspect, i.e., on propositions C1
and C2. This means that node Y1 should be connected with a node containing state
C1, and node Y2 with a node containing state C2. The most straightforward way of
Table 3 Probability table for node H01 in Fig. 2. The states of H
0
1 are defined by the combinations of the
states in nodes H001 and H
00
2
H001 : C1 C1
H002 : C2 C2 C2 C2
H01: C1 1 1 0 0
C1 \ C2 0 0 1 0
D 0 0 0 1
Table 4 Probability table for node H02 in Fig. 2. The states of H
0
2 are defined by the combinations of the
states in nodes H001 and H
00
2
H001 : C1 C1
H002 : C2 C2 C2 C2
H02: C2 1 0 1 0
C1 \ C2 0 1 0 0
D 0 0 0 1
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achieving this in the model is for Y1 to be a child of H
00
1 , and Y2 a child of H
00
2 . Thus,
Y1 copies the state of X when C1 is true, and is independent of X when C1 is true (see
Table 7). The same principle holds for Y2 (Table 8), with the additional constraint
that Y2 copies the state of Y1 in every case where both traces come from the same
source (defined by node L). Finally, node Y1Y2 combines the states of Y1 and Y2 as
ordered pairs, as proposed by Taroni et al. (2006) (see Table 9). Putting all of these
considerations together produces the Bayesian network shown in Fig. 2.
There are two ways to use the Bayesian network, which we will illustrate in the
next two sections: the user can either update the prior probability distributions over
the propositions to posterior probability distributions given the evidence (see Sect.
6), or the user can use the Bayesian network to evaluate the probabilities forming
the ratio of the value of the evidence (Eq. 1) for a given pair of propositions (see
Sect. 7). Both of these are useful means for a forensic scientist to convey the value
of the evidence to a fact-finder.
6 Using the Bayesian network to update the prior probability distribution
to a posterior probability distribution
Fact-finders and lawyers are interested in the probability distribution over the
propositions given the forensic scientist’s evidence. The Bayesian network
Table 5 Probability table for node H001 in Fig. 2
H: D D
L: 1 donor 2 donors 1 donor 2 donors
H001 : C1 1 s 0 0
C1 0 1 - s 1 1
This probability table contains the parameter s = Pr(C1|2 donors, D)
Table 6 Probability table for node H002 in Fig. 2
H: D D
L: 1 donor 2 donors 1 donor 2 donors
H001 : C1 C1 C1 C1 C1 C1 C1 C1
H002 : C2 1 n/a 0 1 n/a 0 n/a 0
C2 0 n/a 1 0 n/a 1 n/a 1
Note that the second, fifth and seventh columns describe impossible combinations of states (i.e., in the
second column, the suspect is a crime stain donor, and there is only a single donor for both crime stains,
yet the suspect is not the donor of crime stain 1; and in the fifth and seventh columns the suspect is not a
crime stain donor, yet crime stain 1 comes from the suspect), so that the probability distribution over
states C2 and C2 is not defined for these events (‘n/a’ = not applicable). For an alternative way of
modeling this conditional probability distribution over the states of node H002 that avoids having these
impossible combinations in the conditional probability table, we refer the reader to the work by Fenton
et al. (2011)
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presented in Fig. 2 can compute this posterior probability distribution for a given
prior probability distribution over the propositions. There are two applications
where a forensic scientist testifying in court would use the model in this way: (1)
when a fact-finder or lawyer interested in the probabilities of the propositions
communicates the information required to define the prior distribution to the
forensic scientist, (2) when the forensic scientist wants to illustrate the evidence’s
effect on several prior probability distributions of different orders of magnitude to
show what the posterior probability distribution would be for each.
To specify the prior probability of each proposition, the user must assess the
values of d, k and s (see the definitions given in Table 1 and in Sect. 4.3).
Practically speaking, the user of the model must enter these values into the Bayesian
network, an action called ‘instantiating’ the corresponding nodes. The Bayesian
network then propagates these values to the rest of the network.
To find the posterior probability distribution given the evidence, the user
instantiates the observed traits for the suspect’s sample and the two traces in nodes
X, Y1 and Y2, respectively. After entering this evidence, the Bayesian network
updates the probability distributions in the remaining nodes according to the laws of
probability and the probabilistic relationships specified by the model. The
probability distributions indicated in the propositional nodes now correspond to
the posterior distributions given the evidence. Mathematically, this updating
corresponds to the application of the laws of probability, in particular Bayes’
theorem. The following numerical example illustrates this concept.
Example Consider a case where crime scene investigators recover two contact
stains on a wall, at a given height above the floor: say, crime stain 1 at 1.5 meters,
and crime stain 2 at 1.8 meters from the floor. There are no witness statements
asserting whether these two traces come from a single source or from two different
sources. We assume that it is, a priori, equally probable for the two traces to come
from a single source as it is for them to come from two different sources, and thus
set k = 0.5. A suspect, with a prior probability assessed at d = 0.1 of being the
source of at least one of the two traces recovered on the crime scene, comes to the
attention of the police. This suspect is particular in that he is very short, measuring
only 1.6 meters. This information makes a contact between the suspect and the
location of crime stain 1 more probable than a contact between the suspect and the
location of crime stain 2. In other words, if only one of the two traces comes from
Table 7 Probability table for node Y1 in Fig. 2. If C1 is true, the state of Y1 is equal to the state of X. If C1
is true, the probability of observing each profile is equal to that profile’s match probability in the relevant
population of possible crime stain donors
H001 : C1 C1
X: C1 C2 Cother C1 C2 Cother
Y1: C1 1 0 0 c1 c1 c1
C2 0 1 0 c2 c2 c2
Cother 0 0 1 1 - c1 - c2 1 - c1 - c2 1 - c1 - c2
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this suspect, it is more probable for this stain to be crime stain 1 than crime stain 2.
For this reason, we set s = 0.75.
The following analysis compares the probability distributions for the three
different types of pairs of propositions by considering pairs H, H01 and H
00
1 (Note that
the Bayesian network presented in Fig. 2 allows for the same analysis with regard to
pairs H, H02 and H
00
2 , focusing on crime stain 2 instead of on crime stain 1. Here,
however, we will focus on crime stain 1). For this, node H02 is superfluous in the
Bayesian network (Fig. 2). In this section, Fig. 3 has omitted this node to avoid
cluttering the Bayesian network’s expanded representations.
Figure 3a gives the prior probability distribution over the nodes of the Bayesian
network for the above described example. The ratio of the probabilities of the
propositions of each pair forms the following prior odds for the three pairs of
propositions defined in Sect. 4.2:4
d
1  d ¼
0:1000
0:9000
¼ 0:1111 for pair H; ð12Þ
dð1  kþ ksÞ
1  d ¼
0:0875
0:9000
¼ 0:0972 for pair H01; and ð13Þ
dð1  kþ ksÞ
dkð1  sÞ þ 1  d ¼
0:0875
0:9125
¼ 0:0959 for pair H001 : ð14Þ
With these numerical calculations, we do not imply that it is possible to attain this
level of precision in practice. The precision of the numerical calculations in Eqs.
(12)–(14), and in the equations of the rest of this and the next section, is only for the
purpose of showing the level of agreement between the Bayesian network’s com-
putations and the algebraic equations.
The comparison of the above results with the prior odds given in Meester and
Sjerps (2003) (see Eqs. 9–11) shows that the latter describe a case where k = 1 and
s = 0.5. The above expressions relax these assumptions by allowing the user to
specify parameters k and s so that they reflect the circumstances of the case as
accurately as possible. Comparing the prior odds for each of the pairs of
propositions with each other reveals that the most general pair of propositions (pair
H) has the greatest odds, and the most specific pair of propositions (pair H001 ) has the
smallest odds. This is logical since the prior odds for a specific crime stain cannot be
Table 9 Probability table for node Y1Y2. This node combines the states of Y1 and Y2 as ordered pairs
Y1: C1 C2 Cother
Y2: C1 C2 Cother C1 C2 Cother C1 C2 Cother
Y1Y2: C1C2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
other 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 Note that, by definition, pair H01 consists of two nonexhaustive propositions. This is not problematic in
this situation, because the evidence introduced later on will render the remaining proposition impossible.
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greater than the general prior odds for the suspect being a donor of any one of the
crime stains.
Example (continued) We now analyze the evidence, and observe Y1 ¼ C1; Y2 ¼
C2 and X ¼ C1; i.e., the suspect’s sample matches crime stain 1. In the population of
potential sources of the two traces, we assume c1 = 0.01 and c2 = 0.02.
Instantiating the evidential nodes X, Y1 and Y2 to their observed traits (Fig. 3b),
produces identical posterior odds of
0:89286
0:10714
 8:3333
for all three pairs of propositions. Algebraically, these posterior odds are given by
ds
ð1  dÞc1
: ð15Þ
(a)                                                                   (b)
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Fig. 3 Expanded representation of the Bayesian network presented in Fig. 2, without node H02, which has
been omitted to avoid cluttering the figure, and to focus the reader’s attention on the probability
distributions in nodes H, H01andH
00
1 . This Bayesian network updates a the prior probability distribution
over the propositions, to b the posterior probability distribution obtained after observing the traits of X, Y1
and Y2. Here, the model is applied to the example described on pages 16 and 18, with d = 0.1,
k = 0.5, s = 0.75, c1 = 0.01 and c2 = 0.02. The observed evidence consists of X ¼ C1; Y1 ¼ C1 and
Y2 ¼ C2: This information is communicated to the Bayesian network by instantiating the evidential nodes
to these observed states. Here, the instantiated nodes are indicated by a thicker border, and the
instantiated state with a probability of 1 in bold. Instantiating the evidential nodes produces identical
posterior odds for the pairs of propositions H, H01andH
00
1 . Note that in b, we could also have instantiated
node Y1Y2 instead of nodes Y1 and Y2 and obtained the same outcome
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The comparison of this ratio with the posterior odds presented in Meester and Sjerps
(2003) (see Eq. 8) shows that Eq. (15) relaxes the assumption of s = 0.5, assumed
in Eq. (8). Equation (15) therefore gives the generalized expression for the posterior
odds for any value of s.
This approach of instantiating the evidential nodes in the Bayesian network is
useful whenever one wants to find a posterior probability distribution for a given
prior probability distribution. This application is limited to situations where the
forensic scientist receives information about the prior probability distribution from
an actor in the legal system, or situations where the forensic scientist assigns
hypothetical prior distributions to illustrate the evidence’s effect on the probabilities
of the propositions. However, the forensic scientist’s role is not to determine the
probability distribution over the propositions. The role of the forensic scientist is to
evaluate the value of the evidence (e.g., Lindley 1977; Aitken and Taroni 2004).
This means that he/she wants to find out to what extent the observed evidence will
affect the probability distribution over the propositions, without knowing what this
probability distribution is.
In addition to computing the posterior probabilities seen in this section, the
Bayesian network allows its user to evaluate the probabilities forming the value of
the evidence for any of the three pairs of propositions. We discuss this use of the
Bayesian network in the next section.
7 Using the Bayesian network to evaluate the value of the evidence
The objective of the forensic scientist’s testimony is to present the value of the
evidence. That is, he/she should present how much more or less probable the
evidence is if the first proposition is true than if the second proposition is true. This
value depends on the formulation of the two propositions. The value of the evidence
for each pair of propositions corresponds to the Bayes factor obtained by dividing
the posterior odds by the prior odds (Table 10).
Mathematically, this value is given by Eq. (1). Applying the third law of
probability for dependent events according to a suspect-anchored perspective (e.g.,
Aitken and Taroni 2004) makes this equation equal to
V ¼ PrðX; Y1; Y2jproposition 1Þ
PrðX; Y1; Y2jproposition 2Þ
¼ PrðY1; Y2jX; proposition 1Þ
PrðY1; Y2jX; proposition 2Þ 
PrðXjproposition 1Þ
PrðXjproposition 2Þ ;
which reduces to
¼ PrðY1; Y2jX; proposition 1Þ
PrðY1; Y2jX; proposition 2Þ ; ð16Þ
given that the profile of the suspect’s sample does not change under the competing
propositions, i.e., Pr(X|proposition 1) = Pr(X|proposition 2).
So, to find the value of the evidence, the Bayesian network calculates the
probabilities forming the numerator and the denominator of Eq. (16). The Bayesian
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network computes the compound probability of Y1 and Y2 in node Y1Y2. This node
indicates the numerator of V for the observed traits of Y1 and Y2 when X and
‘proposition 1’ are instantiated, and the denominator of V when X and ‘proposition
(a)                                                                (b)
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Fig. 4 The Bayesian network computes a the numerator, and b the denominator of the value of the
evidence (Eq. 16) for pair of propositions H, for evidence consisting of X ¼ C1;Y1 ¼ C1 and Y2 ¼ C2:
The instantiated nodes are indicated by a thicker border, and the instantiated state with a probability of 1
in bold. The numerator is the probability of C1C2 in node Y1Y2 when C1 is instantiated in node X and D is
instantiated in node H. The denominator is the probability of C1C2 in node Y1Y2 when C1 is instantiated in
node X and D is instantiated in node H. The calculations are for the example described in Sect. 6
(d = 0.1, k = 0.5 and s = 0.75)
Table 10 The mathematical expressions used by the Bayesian network in Fig. 2 to compute the prior
odds, value of the evidence (Bayes factor) and posterior odds for each of the three pairs of propositions,
H, H01andH
00
1
for pair H: d
1  d|ﬄ{zﬄ}
prior odds
 s
c1|{z}
V
¼ dsð1  dÞc1|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
posterior odds
for pair H01: dð1  kþ ksÞ
1  d|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
prior odds

s
1kþks
c1|ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
V
¼ dsð1  dÞc1|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
posterior odds
for pair H001 : dð1  kþ ksÞ
dkð1  sÞ þ 1  d|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
prior odds

s
1kþks
c1
1d
ð1sÞkdþ1d|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
V
¼ dsð1  dÞc1|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
posterior odds
For the definitions of d, k and s, see Table 1
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2’ are instantiated.5 Figures 4, 5 and 7 illustrate the results obtained in this way for
each of the three pairs of propositions, H, H01 and H
00
1 , for the numerical example
presented in Sect. 6. Again, the expanded representations of the Bayesian network
omit node H02 to avoid cluttering these figures, and to focus the reader’s attention on
the propositional nodes H, H01 and H
00
1 . In the following sections, we discuss each
value in turn, and examine how each is affected by the parameters s, k and d.
7.1 The value of the evidence for pair H
According to Fig. 4, the value of the evidence for pair H is equal to
V ¼ 0:0075
0:0001
¼ 75:
Algebraically, this value is given by
V ¼ ksc2
kc1c2
¼ s
c1
: ð17Þ
The numerator describes the probability of observing the evidence given that at least
one of the crime stains comes from the suspect (proposition D). In this case, the
observation of the evidence is only possible when the two traces come from two
different donors (for which the probability is k), of which the suspect is the donor of
the first trace (probability s), and someone with trait C2 the donor of the second
trace (probability c2). The denominator describes the probability of observing the
evidence given that neither of the crime stains comes from the suspect (proposition
D). In this case, the observation of the evidence corresponds to the event that the
two traces come from two different donors (probability k), of which one has trait C1
(probability c1) and the other trait C2 (probability c2).
For this pair of propositions, V reduces to a linear function of s, ranging from a
minimum of 0 when s = 0 (i.e., when it is a priori impossible for the suspect to be
the source of trace 1 in a case where the suspect is the source of one of the two
traces), to a maximum of 1c1
for s = 1 (i.e., when it is a priori certain that the suspect
is the source of trace 1 in the case that the suspect is the source of one of the two
traces). In the latter case, the value of the evidence is the same as in a one-trace
problem, because, just as in a one-trace problem, it becomes certain to observe a
match between crime stain 1 and the suspect’s sample if proposition D is true.
When s = 0.5, this means that it is equally likely for either of the two traces to
come from the suspect in a case where the suspect is one of two crime stain donors.
This is the additional factor multiplied by 1c1
to produce Eq. (4) derived by Evett
(1987) for the value of one matching stain and one non-matching stain. Underlying
Eq. (4) is therefore the assumption that each of the two traces is equally likely to
come from the suspect if the suspect is the source of one of the two traces. Yet, as
5 Note that the Bayesian network presented here models the probability of Y1 and Y2 as independent of
the suspect’s sample given ‘proposition 2’. This makes the probability of Y1 and Y2 when ‘proposition 2’
and X are instantiated identical to the probability of Y1 and Y2 when only ‘proposition 2’ is instantiated, so
that the instantiation of X is not absolutely necessary in this case.
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Fig. 5 The Bayesian network computes a the numerator, and b the denominator of the value of the
evidence (Eq. 16) for pair of propositions H01, for evidence consisting of X ¼ C1;Y1 ¼ C1 and Y2 ¼ C2:
The nodes with the thicker borders are the instantiated nodes, with the instantiated state indicated with a
probability of 1 in bold. The numerator is the probability of C1C2 in node Y1Y2 when C1 is instantiated in
node X and C1 is instantiated in node H
0
1, and the denominator is the probability of C1C2 in node Y1Y2
when C1 is instantiated in node X and D is instantiated in node H01. These calculations are for the scenario
described in Sect. 6 (d = 0.1, k = 0.5 and s = 0.75)
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Fig. 6 The value of the evidence V for pair H01 as a function of a k and b s. Here, c1 = 0.01. V is an
increasing function of k and s, attaining a maximal value of 1c1 when k = 1 or s = 1, for k = 0, s = 0
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seen in the example on page 16, the two crime stains may not have the same prior
probability of coming from the suspect if they were recovered at different locations
on the crime scene. In this case, it is necessary to replace Eq. (4) with Eq. (17), and
assign a more adequate value for s based on the circumstances of the case.
7.2 The value of the evidence for pair H01
For pair H01, Fig. 5 shows that the value of the evidence is equal to
V ¼ 0:00857
0:0001
¼ 85:7;
which, algebraically, corresponds to
V ¼
ks
1kþks c2
kc1c2
ð18Þ
¼
s
1kþks
c1
: ð19Þ
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Fig. 7 The Bayesian network computes a the numerator and b the denominator of the value of the
evidence (Eq. 16) for pair of propositions H001 , for evidence consisting of X ¼ C1;Y1 ¼ C1 and Y2 ¼ C2:
The nodes with the thicker borders are the instantiated nodes, with the instantiated state indicated with a
probability of 1 in bold. The numerator is the probability of C1C2 in node Y1Y2 when C1 is instantiated in
node X and C1 is instantiated in node H
00
1 , and the denominator is the probability of C1C2 in node Y1Y2
when C1 is instantiated in node X and C1 is instantiated in node H001 . These calculations are for the
scenario described in Sect. 6 (d = 0.1, k = 0.5 and s = 0.75)
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Here, the probability in the numerator is the probability of observing the evidence
given that crime stain 1 comes from the suspect (proposition C1). A priori, there are
two possibilities if proposition C1 is true: either both traces come from the suspect
(for which the probability is 1 - k), or only crime stain 1 comes from the suspect
(for which the probability is ks). The observation of one matching and one non-
matching trace is impossible if both traces come from the suspect. The probability
of observing the evidence is therefore the normalized probability for the latter case
times the probability that the donor of the second trace has trait C2 (probability c2),
as shown in the numerator of Eq. (18). The denominator remains the same as for
pair H. For this pair of propositions, V is an increasing function of both s and k for
all s\ 1 and k\ 1 (Fig. 6). V attains the maximum value of 1c1 when at least one of
these parameters is equal to 1:
– When k = 1, it is certain that the two traces come from two different sources. In
this case, it is, a priori, certain that crime stain 2 does not come from the suspect
given proposition C1, and the only possibility left under this proposition is that
the suspect is the source of only crime stain 1. The normalized probability in the
numerator of Eq. (18) therefore reduces to 1, so that the probability of observing
the evidence given C1 and X ¼ C1 is equal to 1 9 c2. With the denominator,
this reduces the numerator of V to 1.
– When s = 1, it is a priori certain that trace 1 comes from the suspect if exactly
one of the traces comes from the suspect. The normalized probability in the
numerator of Eq. (18) thus reduces to k. The probability of observing the
evidence is therefore equal to the probability that the two traces come from two
different sources times the probability that the other donor has trait C2; i.e.,
k 9 c2. With the denominator, this reduces the numerator of V to 1.
According to the reasoning in Meester and Sjerps (2003), Eq. (6) was obtained
for k = 1 and s = 0.5. In this case, V is maximum for this pair of propositions
because of k = 1. However, the assumption of k = 1 can only be made in very
specific cases. By definition, this assumption must be made before observing the
evidence, so it can only be based on other information in the case. For example, one
could imagine a case with a crime scene in a location under high surveillance and
cleaned on a regular and scheduled basis: here, a surveillance camera showing two
unidentifiable individuals on the scene on the day the traces were deposited, where
individual 1 was only present in the location of the recovery of crime stain 1, and
individual 2 only in the location of the recovery of crime stain 2, might justify an
assumption of k = 1. Other than these very particular circumstances, it is difficult to
imagine a scenario where such an unmitigated assumption could be made.
To justify an assumption of s = 1, the circumstances must be just as particular.
In this case, they must be such that they make it impossible for the suspect to be the
source of only crime stain 2. This could be the case when it is physically impossible
for the suspect to have been in contact with the surface of crime stain 2. However,
even in these cases it is difficult to justify s = 1 for DNA traces in situations where
secondary transfer is possible (e.g., Goray et al. 2010).
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Fig. 8 The value of the evidence V for pair H001 in function of: a k for d = 0.1, b s for d = 0.1, c k for
d = 0.5, d s for d = 0.5, e k for d = 0.9, and f s for d = 0.9. Here, c1 = 0.01. V is an increasing function
of k and d, and equal to 1c1 for s = 1. It tends towards a maximum of
1
c1ð1dÞ for k = 1 and s ! 0;s = 0
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In most cases, V will therefore be less than 1c1
: For s = 0.5, the exact value will
lie somewhere on the dashed curve of Fig. 6a below the maximum point at k = 1.
According to Fig. 6a, the range of values obtained for V for different values of k
is smaller for high values of s. This is because a large value of s leads to a high prior
probability that trace 1 comes from the suspect, regardless of whether there was one
donor or two donors. That is, if the suspect was the only donor, then it is certain that
trace 1 comes from the suspect, and if the suspect was one of two donors, then the
prior probability that trace 1 comes from the suspect (=s) is also high. Therefore a
large value for s leads to a high probability in the numerator of V (Eq. 19),
regardless of the value of k.
This is no longer the case for small values of s. If s is small, the prior probability
that trace 1 comes from the suspect will be determined mostly by the probability
that both traces come from the suspect, i.e., 1 - k. The numerator of V (Eq. 19) will
therefore vary greatly according to the value of k. The greater k, the smaller the
prior probability of a single donor. Since the evidence is such that it rejects the
hypothesis of a single donor, the probability of observing the evidence given
proposition C1 (i.e., the numerator of V) is greater when the prior probability of a
single donor is small. That is, a small prior probability for a single donor increases
the normalized probability of the event that only crime stain 1 comes from the
suspect, figuring in the numerator of V. Thus, the overall value of the evidence is an
increasing function of k.
Figure 6b shows that the range of values obtained for V for different values of s
remains 0 to 1c1
; regardless of the value of k. This is because the evidence (a match
with crime stain 1 and a non-match with crime stain 2) is such that its value will
always be 0 in a case where it is impossible for crime stain 1 to come from the
suspect, given that there were two different donors (i.e., when s = 0), and equal to 1c1
whenever it is certain that crime stain 1 comes from the suspect, given that there
were two different donors (i.e., when s = 1). Thus, the value of the evidence is an
increasing function of s.
7.3 The value of the evidence for pair H001
According to Fig. 7, the value of the evidence for pair H001 is equal to
V ¼ 0:00857
9:86  105 ¼ 86:9;
which is computed by
V ¼
ks
1kþks c2
kc1
1d
ð1sÞkdþ1d c2
ð20Þ
¼
s
1kþks
c1
1d
ð1sÞkdþ1d
ð21Þ
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Here, the probability in the numerator is the same as for pair H01. The probability in
the denominator is the probability of observing the evidence given that crime stain 1
does not come from the suspect (proposition C1). A priori, there are two possibilities
if proposition C1 is true: either the suspect is only the source of crime stain 2 [for
which the probability is (1 - s)kd], or neither of the two traces comes from the
suspect (for which the probability is 1 - d). The observation of the evidence is only
possible in the latter case. Therefore, the probability of the evidence is the proba-
bility that the two traces come from two different donors, of which one has trait C1
and the other trait C2; i.e., kc1c2, times the normalized probability that neither of the
traces comes from the suspect (Eq. 20).
For this pair of propositions, V is a function of s, k and d (Fig. 8). Just like for
pair H01, V is equal to
1
c1
whenever s = 1. In this case, the numerator of V reduces to
kc2 as explained above for pair H01, and the denominator of V becomes equal to
kc1c2, because the possibility of the suspect being the source of crime stain 2 when
there are two different crimes stain donors becomes impossible. With the numerator,
the denominator of V therefore reduces to c1.
Yet, unlike for pair H01, k = 1 no longer produces V ¼ 1c1 (e.g., Fig. 8a, c, e). This
is because k = 1 (i.e., there were two different donors) does not, a priori, exclude
the possibility that the suspect is the source of the second trace given that crime
stain 1 does not come from the suspect (proposition C1). For k = 1, V is actually a
decreasing function of s, attaining a minimum of 1c1 when s = 1 (Fig. 8b, d, f). This
is because the possibility of the suspect being only the source of crime stain 2
becomes less probable as s increases, thus increasing the normalized probability of
the event that neither of the traces comes from the suspect. This increases the
denominator of V, and decreases the whole value of the evidence. However, when
s ! 0; s = 0, the probability of the suspect being only the source of crime stain 2
increases, which decreases the normalized probability of neither trace coming from
the suspect. This decreases the denominator of V, and increases the whole value of
the evidence. Thus the maximum of V for this pair of propositions is greater than 1c1
(which is the maximum value for the other two pairs of propositions):
when s ! 0 and k ¼ 1; V ! 1
c1ð1  dÞ
: ð22Þ
In other words, for s\ 1, the possibility that the suspect is the source of crime stain
2 is not excluded. Yet, if the suspect is not the source of crime stain 1 (proposition
C1), the evidence is only possible when neither stain comes from the suspect
(probability of 1 - d), so that the factor 1 - d has an increasing influence in the
denominator of V for s ! 0; s = 0.
This effect becomes more pronounced as d increases (Fig. 8b, d, f). A larger
value of d produces a smaller probability in the denominator of V, and therefore a
greater value of V.
The value of the evidence proposed by Meester and Sjerps (2003) for this pair of
propositions (Eq. 7) is equal to
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1c1
1d
1
2
dþ1d
:
Again, this value assumes k = 1 and s = 0.5. Its application is therefore just as
limited by the assumption k = 1 as the value of the evidence they propose for pair
H01 (see page 24). This value is the point at s = 0.5 on the solid lines in Fig. 8b, d, f.
With k\ 1, V would be smaller, lying on one of the other curves in these graphs.
7.4 Comparison of the values of the evidence
As Meester and Sjerps (2003) concluded, pairs of differently formulated proposi-
tions for the two-trace problem lead to different values of the evidence. For the
example presented, the value of the evidence is greatest for pair H001 , and smallest for
pair H. This is because the probability of observing a match with stain 1 and a non-
match with stain 2 is greatest given proposition C1 and smallest given proposition
C1:
The derived formulae for calculating the value of the evidence show that this
value is a function of s for all three pairs of propositions, a function of k for two of
the three pairs (pairs H01 and H
00
1 ), and a function of d for one pair (pair H
00
1 ). In the
two-trace problem, the value of the evidence is therefore not based solely on the
analytical results provided by the laboratory analyses of the collected evidence, that
is, on the match probabilities of these results in the relevant population of possible
sources. In addition, the value depends on parameters assessed on the basis of the
case circumstances prior to observing the evidence. The more specific the
competing pair of propositions are, the more parameters will determine the value
of the evidence for these propositions. That is, propositions focusing only on one of
the two traces require additional information regarding the total number of donors
on the crime scene and/or the prior assumption on the suspect’s implication as a
donor of any of the traces on the scene. To accurately evaluate the value of the
evidence in a two-trace problem, an evaluator’s knowledge must therefore extend
beyond the observations made on the evidence, to the facts regarding the case
circumstances.
8 Discussion and conclusions
The role of the forensic scientist is to evaluate the value of the evidence (e.g., Evett
1998). In the forensic two-trace problem, this has been somewhat perplexing since
three different formulations of the competing pair of propositions lead to three
different quantifications of this value (Meester and Sjerps 2003).
In this paper, we have provided a more general vision of the entire two-trace
problem by constructing a Bayesian network that includes each of the three pairs of
propositions as a separate node in the model. Through an illustrative example, we
demonstrate how to use the network to evaluate the value of the evidence for each
pair of propositions. The different structural relationships between each of the pairs
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and the evidence inevitably leads to different values of the evidence, each
addressing the two-trace problem from a different angle.
The flexibility of the value of the evidence to adapt to each pair of propositions is
an advantage, not an inconvenience. A forensic scientist’s task is to evaluate the
relative support provided by the evidence for one proposition with respect to an
alternative proposition (i.e., the value of the evidence) (e.g., Evett 1998). And this,
he/she must do with regard to the very particular framework of circumstances that
reflects the case, and for the precise propositions of interest to the court. Therefore,
it is important that the propositions be chosen and formulated with care, and that
these be based on the particular circumstances related to the case. The different
values of the evidence then complement each other, providing the scientist with a
range of formulae from which he/she can select the most appropriate in view of the
pair of propositions of interest to the court. The crucial issue is to understand what
assumptions lie behind each formula, in order to correctly use it in the context of the
case. In this respect, the Bayesian network offers transparency through its graphical
representation of the dependence relationships among the variables. In particular, it
models the dependency of each of the random variables on three unknown
parameters:
– d, the probability that at least one trace comes from the suspect,
– k, the probability that the two traces come from two different donors (Dawid
2004), and
– s, the probability that trace 1 comes from the suspect in a case where the suspect
is one of two different donors.
The value of the evidence is a function of s for all three pairs of propositions, a
function of k for the two pairs where the prosecutor’s proposition relates only to one
trace, and [as presented in Meester and Sjerps (2003)] a function of d for the pair
where the defence’s proposition relates only to one trace. To accurately evaluate the
value of the evidence, an evaluator is therefore obliged to have information on the
case circumstances. If it is difficult to obtain precise assessments for the unknown
parameters, the Bayesian network environment allows the user to specify subjective
probability distributions over each parameter space.
Note that the model presented in this paper is still based on several assumptions,
notably on the independence between the three unknown parameters. The validity of
this assumption will depend on the circumstantial information available in a case,
and on the evaluator’s personal assessments of the parameters. The results of this
work justify a careful examination and further study on the dependence relation-
ships between these parameters in cases where the assumption of independence no
longer holds.
Notwithstanding, the major advantage of using the Bayesian network is when the
evidence of the two traces must be combined with other types of evidence. The
fundamental structure of this Bayesian network allows for an extension to more than
two traces, as well as an extension to address activity level propositions (Gittelson
et al. 2012). Thanks to its graphical architecture, this model can be inserted as a
component part in a larger network for a more complex inference problem. Given
that most forensic cases involve numerous traces of different types of evidence, this
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possibility is an indispensable property for all practical applications. The generic
Bayesian network presented in this paper therefore offers a transparent and practical
tool for tackling two-trace problems in forensic casework.
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